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ABSTRACT 
BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) serves as the primary 
routing protocol for the Internet, enabling Autonomous 
Systems (individual network operators) to exchange 
network reachability information. Alongside significant 
on-going research and development efforts, there is a 
practical need to understand the nature of events that occur 
on the Internet.  
Network operators are acutely aware of security-related 
incidents such as ‘Prefix Hijacking’ as well as the impact 
of network instabilities that ripple through the Internet. 
Recent research focused on the study of BGP anomalies 
(both network/prefix instability and security-related 
incidents) has been based on the analysis of historical logs. 
Further analysis to understand the nature of these 
anomalous events is not always sufficient to be able to 
differentiate malicious activities, such as prefix- or sub-
prefix- hijacking, from those events caused by inadvertent 
misconfigurations. In addition, such techniques are 
challenged by a lack of sufficient resources to store and 
process data feeds in real-time from multiple BGP Vantage 
Points (VPs).  
In this paper, we present a BGP Deep-analysis 
application developed using the PNDA (Platform for 
Network Data Analytics) ‘Big-Data’ platform. PNDA 
provides a highly scalable environment that enables the 
ingestion and processing of ‘live’ BGP feeds from many 
vantage points in a schema-agnostic manner. The Apache 
Spark-based application, in conjunction with PNDA’s 
distributed processing capabilities, is able to perform high-
level insights as well as near-to-real-time statistical 
analysis.  
KEYWORDS 
Border Gateway Protocol, Big-data, Anomaly detection, 
Apache Spark, Hadoop. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
On the 26th of April, 2017, a ‘prefix hijacking’ event 
occurred that affected a number of financial services 
companies around the world. The impact of the event was 
such that traffic was in part, diverted and directed to 
another network that claimed to be the owner of the IPv4 
address space. 
The nature of the event was such that, depending on 
‘distance’ between your network and that of the impacted 
companies, the ‘newly’ announced network would now 
appeared be ‘closer’ (or ‘shorter’ in BGP terms) and 
therefore would be preferred.  
 
 
Figure 1: BGP AS Path length preference 
In the diagram above, the network operator responsible 
for Autonomous System (AS) 10 advertises the IPv4 prefix 
X. From the position of AS20, the ‘distance’ is considered 
to be an AS Path length of 4, (AS13, AS12, AS11, AS10). 
In the case of prefix hijacking, the same IPv4 prefix, X, 
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was announced as being located in AS15. Given the 
proximity of AS20 to AS15 with an AS Path length of 3, 
traffic that originally flowed from AS20 toward AS10 will 
now be directed to AS15. However, if you were located in 
AS11 or AS12, the AS Path length is still shorter towards 
AS10 than towards AS15 and as a result, traffic will 
continue to flow towards AS10.  
An additional element of the 26th of April event, was 
the announcement of ‘more-specific prefixes’ from the 
source of the attack, also known as ‘sub-prefix injection’. 
The BGP protocol’s path selection algorithm prefers 
‘more-specific’ prefixes before considering the AS Path 
length.  
 
 
Figure 2: BGP AS Path length with ‘longer prefix’ 
In the diagram above both AS10 and AS15 announce 
the IPv4 prefix X. In addition, AS15 announced the ‘more-
specific prefix’, X.1. Since routers in the Internet operate 
on the premise of ‘longest match’, in such a case, 
regardless of the AS path length, the path to the more-
specific prefix (X.1) will be preferred and traffic from all 
AS’s other than AS10, destined to addresses in the X.1 
address range, will be diverted towards the attacker’s 
network (AS15). 
For the purposes of illustration, let us assume that 
AS10 announced the IPv4 prefix 123.123.0.0/18. During 
the attack, AS15 also announced the IPv4 prefix 
123.123.0.0/18 and in addition, the IPv4 prefix 
123.123.63.0/24. Given the use of ‘longest match’, any 
traffic destined to an IPv4 address in the range 
123.123.63.0-255 would be sent towards AS15, rather than 
the legitimate origin AS. 
While it is possible that the announcement was as a 
result of an error, the announcement of more-specific 
prefixes that ‘targeted’ the financial institutions, makes it 
less likely to have been a mistake. There are well-known 
solutions such as RPKI[1], that provide a mechanism by 
which one can verify the authenticity of prefix 
announcements but gaps in adoption and usage of the 
RPKI solution provide the opportunity for further events to 
occur. 
It should also be noted that if network operators follow 
BGP security best practices, in respect to filtering 
incoming advertisements and specifically blocking the 
receipt of their own prefixes, they are typically unaware of 
a prefix hijack incident taking place until an impacted user 
contacts them! 
In order to be able to detect and mitigate a prefix 
hijack, network operators need to have an ability to ‘see’ 
outside of their network perimeter, in order to understand 
what other networks ‘see’ in respect to the prefixes relating 
to that AS.  
With at the time of writing, over 660,000 prefixes 
present in the Internet routing table, looking for erroneous 
BGP events such as the one described above, is akin to 
looking for a ‘needle in a haystack’. In a world where real-
time system, such as those used by the financial services 
industry, are impacted, real-time, or close to real-time 
detection and reporting system are also required. 
In this paper, we will describe how event analysis can 
be performed over the BGP data-set using Big-data 
analysis techniques, and that we can move towards a 
position where real-time events can be detected and 
reported in real-time. In addition, we will describe a 
generic Big-data platform that can be readily adapted to 
consume and process a wide range of data types.  
2 Related Work 
According to the recent technical review [2], 
techniques in BGP anomaly detection have been 
dominated by time-series analysis, machine learning, 
statistical pattern recognition, and validation of BGP 
updates based on history log. These significant works are 
either limited to identifying some anomalies or focused on 
‘after-event’ analysis based on datasets where available. 
As the survey correctly pointed out in its’ conclusion, there 
is still much to be done to detect BGP anomaly in real-time 
such that network operators can mitigate the spreading of 
anomalies across networks.   
Due to the ‘openness’ of the BGP protocol, one can 
claim the false ownership of one or more prefixes (i.e. 
prefix hijacking) and start a Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attack. Such false prefix path announcement can also be 
propagated over networks due to policy misconfigurations. 
Existing automated anomaly detection techniques with 
rules learned from a ‘stable’ environment (experimental 
testbed or historical data) can easily become obsolete 
overtime and fail to deal with modern network attacks. 
In parallel to automated anomaly detection techniques, 
research efforts have also focused on advanced 
Towards Near Real-Time BGP Deep Analysis: A Big-Data 
Approach 
IMC 2017 
 
 3 
visualization techniques to help network operators to 
understand BGP routing instability and identify potential 
anomalies. Such visualization tools range from those that 
visualize raw BGP update events, such as BGPlay[3] and 
LinkRank[4], to those with additional statistical view to 
show historical trends and current deviations, such as BGP 
eye[5] and Vistracer[6].  
The emergence of big data technologies makes it 
possible to combine machine-automated analysis and 
exploratory analysis in a hybrid manner, in order to 
provide anomaly detection in real-time or near real-time. 
Machine-automated processes are used to generate alerts 
based on patterns/deviations learned from incrementally 
increasing historical data and live updates. Visualization 
tools then helps network operators to dive into observed 
BGP events and validate reported alerts. In 2016, the 
Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) 
published BGPStream [6], an open-source software 
framework for both offline analysis of historical MRT 
feeds and real-time prefix/AS monitoring. There are also 
commercial players Kentik [8] and BGPmon (OpenDNS) 
[9] that provide platforms for network data analytics and 
real-time intelligence.  
The work presented in this paper uses a similar semi-
automated approach, leveraging an open-source BGP feed 
collection framework in conjunction with an open-source 
big data platform. Compared to other existed approaches, 
we provided a versatile and scalable end-to-end solution 
that enables the collection of live BGP updates in a 
schema-agnostic manner. In addition, the work offers the 
ability to process data at scale as well as being a platform 
that can be applied to other data-sets and applications. 
3 Goals and Challenges 
BGPv4 is the control-plane protocol that drives the 
Internet. The Internet itself is a highly volatile 
environment; from a single vantage point, we observe on 
average ~ 3 million BGP updates a day. Our main goal was 
to create a solution to help network operators extract useful 
signals from the ‘noise’ such that they can understand the 
changes in the Internet that may impact their own 
operations, and to do so in near real-time.  
In order to gain better insight, it is important to perform 
the analysis on data taken from multiple BGP Vantage 
Points (VPs), each of which has a view of the Internet. 
Collecting BGP data from globally distributed VPs poses a 
series of technical difficulties. Due to the distributed nature 
of VPs, BGP event data cannot be readily synchronized. 
How one can collect BGP updates from the VPs in a time-
synchronous and format agnostic manner, becomes the 
first technical issue. In this work, we leverage an open-
source project, SNAS.io [10](Streaming Network Analysis 
System), that supports streaming live BGP updates and is 
highly scalable. 
Another challenge comes from the accumulation of 
data over time. There are two issues related to this. First, 
we need to provide a scalable storage. Secondly, we need a 
solution that will enable us to perform the required analysis 
in near real-time. In this work, we adopted state-of-the-art 
big data technologies and leveraged the PNDA.io [11], an 
open-source big data framework. With PNDA, we were 
able to utilize a file system distributed across multiple data 
nodes to store historical data meanwhile minimizing 
processing time in batch mode to keep pace with live data 
streaming.  
Finally, the solution aims to provide a versatile and 
extensible solution for a broad range of applications and 
users. Using advanced visualization techniques, we are 
able to provide continuous monitoring on BGP anomalies 
along with capability of investigating historical trends from 
three different viewpoints, AS connectivity, AS path view, 
and prefix view.  
4  End-to-End Architecture 
Figure 3 shows the end-to-end architecture of BGP 
deep analysis application, which consists of three main 
layers: 
• Data collection layer 
• Data storage & processing layer 
• Data visualization layer 
 
 
Figure 3: BGP deep analysis end-to-end technical 
architecture 
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4.1 Data collection and aggregation 
In order to ingest BGP information, the system makes 
use of an open-source project called SNAS.io. SNAS 
supports the consumption of data presented in the BGP 
Monitoring Protocol (BMP) format [12].  
In many cases, BGP monitoring is performed using an 
instrumented BGP ‘listener’ process running on a compute 
host. The process is added into a network operator’s BGP 
topology and therefore hears the BGP event updates that 
pass across the network. A major limitation of this method 
is that it relies on BGP’s advertisement selection process. 
The selection process will consume all of the received 
BGP updates, make its ‘best-path’ selection and advertise 
only the best-paths (Post-Rib). Those received paths that 
have not been selected are discarded and more importantly 
in the context of this work, cannot be readily obtained from 
the router. 
 
Figure 4: BGP data source 
Routers that support the BMP protocol are able to send 
to a BMP ‘listener’, such as SNAS.io, all of the BGP 
updates that router has received before the BGP path 
selection algorithm comes into effect (Pre-Rib). This key 
capability means that the system can record events before 
any form of filtering takes place. In addition, SNAS.io 
supports RouteViews [13], enabling the system to obtain 
observations from many locations around the world. 
Once the data has been received by SNAS.io, the data 
is passed to a Logstash [14] process, an open-source 
component that is used to consume and in this case, encode 
the BMP data for storage in the PNDA platform’s Hadoop 
[15] storage system. The BMP data is encoded in an avro 
[16] wrapper and placed onto the PNDA system’s Kakfa 
bus. The wrapper provides common metadata that is used 
by Gobblin [17] in order to organize and write the data 
within the HDFS folder on a per-topic, per-hour, per-BMP 
‘listener’ basis. The BGP data is now available for 
applications to inspect and process. 
One should note that a wide variety of data formats can 
be processed and encoded using Logstash or could be 
written directly to the Kafka [18] bus. This makes the 
PNDA system flexible and extensible. 
4.2 Underlying big data platform  
Consuming and processing data of a particular type and 
construct can be performed using specifically-optimized 
processing pipelines. Such pipelines are typically designed 
for deployment in a specific environment, reducing the 
ability to reuse the solution in other environments or with 
other data types. While there may be performance 
optimizations that can be realized as a result of the design 
and technology selection, one is left with a bespoke 
solution. 
When considering the technologies that can be applied 
to the particular problem space, it is valuable to look at 
adjacent fields for inspiration and for a sense of ‘scale’. 
What may be considered to be a sizeable data-set in one 
field of work, is considered small or even insignificant in 
another. 
The BGP Deep Analysis work is considered to be an 
application running on top of generalized ‘Big-data’ 
platform. For many people, ‘Big-data’ is synonymous with 
‘Hadoop’ and a series of technologies that have grown up 
in this space. While the use of Hadoop ecosystem 
technologies is common-place in some areas of business 
and technology today, they have not been applied to the 
networking space until very recently. 
Moreover, building a Big-data platform does not stop 
with the deployment of a Hadoop cluster. Additional 
components are required in order to be able to ingest data, 
potentially in a wide variety of forms, volumes and 
velocities. Another set of components are required to 
expose the data in a manner that Data Scientists can 
interact with. The rate of developments in open source Big 
data analytics technologies is extremely rapid, but 
combining multiple technologies into an end-to-end 
solution can be extremely complex and time-consuming.  
The current state of the networking industry is that each 
network operator is solving this problem independently, 
leveraging upstream Hadoop distributions to build custom 
analytics platforms and applications.  These custom 
implementations become operator-specific siloes, which 
are not interoperable; each operator owns the software 
lifecycle and associated development costs for their 
implementation.   
For the BGP Deep Analysis work, the open source 
PNDA environment has been used. PNDA brings together 
a number of open source technologies to provide a scalable 
open platform on top of which analytics applications can 
be developed and deployed. PNDA provides a Hadoop 
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cluster, with data distributed across ‘data-nodes’ both for 
efficiency of processing and for resilience, as well as the 
components and capabilities required to offer support for 
multiple end-to-end pipelines, on a single platform.  
 
 
Figure 5: PNDA block diagram 
A fundamental premise of ‘Big-Data’ is to obtain and 
store data in its rawest form. In many traditional data 
applications, data is modified or transformed on ingest, 
resulting in the reduction of information as the data is 
‘massaged’ into a required format. A side-effect of this 
method of operation is that if another application wishes to 
make use of the data, it is already operating on a refined 
subset, rather than the initial ‘raw’ information.  
The PNDA platform supports a wide-range of off-the-
shelf plugins as well the creation of custom adapters, 
enabling the ingestion of structured and unstructured data 
such as log messages, SNMP events, metrics/time-series 
data and network telemetry. 
Another premise of a Big-data platform is the 
performance of processing where the data resides, rather 
than moving the data from storage to a location where the 
analysis application executes. The platform supports the 
use of Apache Spark-based batch and streaming 
applications 
4.3 BGP app  
Similar to conventional three-tier Web application, the 
BGP Web server presented a Web-based UI presenting to 
the operator results generated by two Spark-based 
applications, the BGP deep analysis application and the 
BGP security application. Both applicaitions are scheduled 
as Apache Spark micro-batch processes and process raw 
BGP data streamed into PNDA via Kafka brokers and then 
persisted in HDFS by a Gobblin process.  
The BGP deep analysis application is scheduled on 
frequent interval basis and processes raw BGP data to 
aggregate behaviors on a per-AS and per-AS Path basis. In 
particular, it characterizes the stabilities of AS and AS path 
using the key features as listed in Table 1. The key features 
obtained from the BGP data are the  ‘AS path change’ 
(announcement and withdrawal of a prefix), the rank value 
derived from the number of prefixes that transit via a 
particular AS or a particular inter-AS path, rank change, 
and rank change frequency for each AS and AS path. By 
using these features we can derive the importance of an AS 
and AS path over the Internet as well as the stability (the 
higher change frequencies, the less stable).  
 
ID Feature 
1 AS Path change 
2 AS rank  
3 AS path rank 
4 AS rank change 
5 AS path rank change 
6 AS rank change frequency  
7 AS path rank change frequency 
Table 1: Key fields for AS analysis 
In parallel to the BGP deep analysis application, the 
BGP security application is scheduled to analyze network 
anomalies including RFC5735 [19] prefixes and netblocks 
that are unallocated and therefore should not ever seen in 
BGP updates, short prefixes (i.e. those prefixes with a 
mask between /0-/7 and those with a mask of /25-/32. 
Further work identifies those prefixes that originate from 
multiple AS’s and ‘sub-prefix injection’ cases. Table 2 lists 
the key features used to detect network anomalies.  
 
ID Feature 
1 Prefix origin change 
2 Prefix length 
3 Rare Prefix 
4 Subprefix origin change 
Table 2: Key fields for Security analysis 
Both applications are running in batch mode and 
schedule apache Spark MapR jobs across data nodes via 
Hadoop YARN resource manager, in short ‘spark-on-
yarn’. At the end of batch processing, the applications 
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write their results into HBase tables, a key-value database, 
and make them available via an Impala query interface. 
The front-end portal provides a Web-based UI that notifies 
network operators to network anomalies and employs 
advanced visualization techniques to enrich the network 
operators’ understandings of the nature of anomalies, as 
well as enabling the investigation of data using long 
historical analysis.  
5 BGP Deep Analysis  
The Deep Analysis applications investigate two key 
areas today; BGP AS path and prefix behavior and BGP 
Security. With the data platform consuming event data 
from multiple VPs, the application is able to process 
aggregate data to understand, for example, which AS’s 
appear in AS Paths most frequently? Which AS’s originate 
the largest number of prefixes? Which AS’s exhibit the 
largest number of ‘changes’ over time.  
 
 
Figure 6: Top N analysis 
Using further mapping techniques, we can determine 
the connectivity characteristics of a particular AS, 
rendering the results in a graph. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Plot comparison to two AS’s 
Focused analysis on paths between two AS has 
identified in one 24-hour period: 
• Shortest path – 4 hops 
• Longest path – 29 hops 
• Longest unique AS path – 6 
• Unique paths - 9 
• Largest prepend count – 17 
• Prepend variation – [7-17]  
 
The Security analysis looked for BGP prefixes that 
should not be observed. This includes looking for 
‘unallocated’ address space. Observations over a 12-hour 
period revealed over 4000 unique ‘unallocated’ prefixes 
being announced. In addition, a module was developed in 
order to identify cases of ‘sub-prefix injection’. At the time 
of submission, this study was still ongoing.  
 
7 Conclusions 
The work covered in this paper has shown how techniques 
and technologies from the Big-data realm can be applied to 
the Networking space. The work has demonstrated the use 
of applications that examine, identify and alert network 
operators to events that have the potential to be highly 
disruptive to their customers and services.  
In addition, the use of a Big-data platform enables the 
further exploration and analysis of other data sets both 
inside and outside of the networking realm, without having 
to create entirely new data acquisition, storage and 
processing pipelines. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
The figure below shows a simplistic graph. The ‘top’ line shows 
the original prefix announcement, originating from AS 13118. On 
the 26th of April, at 22:40, the ‘sub-prefix hijack’ was advertised, 
originating in AS12389. This is shown in the ‘spot’ point in the 
lower third of the graph. This announcement led to significant 
service interruption for the affect institution. 
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Figure 1: Prefix Hijacking of attacking financial institutions, 
Apr. 26th, 2017 
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